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No. 20161019-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SAUL MARTINEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant is incarcerated.
__________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
As required by rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply
brief is “limited to responding to the facts and arguments raised in the appellee’s
... principal brief.” Specifically, it responds to the State’s claim that the Tooele
residents’ out-of-court-statements were non-hearsay. See SB at 15-23. It also
addresses the State’s contention that the legislature expressly prohibits the
merger of discharge of a firearm and attempted murder. See id. at 31-35. This
reply does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that
do not merit reply.

ARGUMENT
I.

This Court should reverse because the trial court admitted the
out-of-court statements of unidentified Tooele residents in
violation of the rule against hearsay.
In opening, Martinez argues that the Tooele residents’ statements were

inadmissible hearsay. See OB at 15-21. The State counters that the statements
were not hearsay, and even if they were, they were not prejudicial. See SB at 1530. Contrary to the State’s claim, the Tooele residents’ statements were offered
for the truth of the matter asserted. The opening brief adequately addresses the
State’s no-prejudice claim. See id. at 21-27.
The record shows that the Tooele residents’ statements were offered for
their truth. See id. at 15-21. In arguing otherwise, the State faults Martinez for
incorporating considerations of relevance and detail in his hearsay analysis. See
SB at 19-23. Moreover, it relies on cases that are distinguishable from this case.
See id. at 17-18.
First, the State is wrong to suggest that the hearsay determination is
neither informed by the relevance of the purported non-truth purpose nor the
statement’s content or detail. See id. at 19-23.“Whether a statement is offered for
the truth of the matter asserted is a question of law . . . .” Haltom, 2005 UT App
348, ¶8, 121 P.3d 42. In answering this question, “[i]t is necessary to look to the
real purpose of the offered statement, not the purpose urged by its proponent, to
determine if it is offered to prove truth.” State v. Wells, 522 N.W.2d 304, 308 n.1
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994); United States v. Edelen, 561 F. App'x 226, 234 (4th Cir.
2

2014) (“In order to determine whether an out-of-court statement qualifies as
inadmissible hearsay under this Rule, the district court must ‘identify [ ]
the actual purpose for which a party is introducing’ the statement at issue.”).
In discerning the real purpose, Utah courts have relied on objective
considerations taken in light of all the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. McNeil,
2013 UT App 134, ¶49, 302 P.3d 844. For instance, our courts have considered
the extent to which the proffered purpose was “an issue” in the case, see Stratford
v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984); whether the relevance of the
statement depends on its truth, McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Francis v. Nat'l
DME, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55, 350 P.3d 615; how the statement was used, McNeil,
2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Francis, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55; and the content, detail,
and specificity of the statements. State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24, 155 P.3d
909; see also Wells, 522 N.W.2d at 308 n.1 (“By eliciting specific statements, not
merely focusing on the fact a conversation occurred, the State attempted to
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the conversation.”). While no single
factor is dispositive, all of these considerations inform whether a statement is
offered for its truth. See Stratford, 689 P.2d at 364; Francis, 2015 UT App 119,
¶55; McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49; Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24.
The State suggests that concerns over relevance and unnecessary detail are
the concerns of other rules. See SB at 19-23. True, other rules may be offended by
unnecessarily detailed statements that are offered to prove a matter that is not in
dispute. E.g., Utah R. Evid. Rule 403. But these circumstances also offer objective
3

evidence of the real purpose for which a statement is offered. See, e.g., McNeil,
2013 UT App 134, ¶49.
Moreover, as shown, Utah courts recognize that considerations of detail,
content, and relevance have a place in the hearsay analysis. See Stratford, 689
P.2d at 364; Francis, 2015 UT App 119, ¶55; McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶49;
Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶24. And so do courts elsewhere. E.g., Wells, 522 N.W.2d
at 308 n.1 (“A statement is offered to prove the truth of its assertion if the
substance of the statement must be believed by the jury to have true relevance in
the case.”); Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 566–67 (Ind. 2014)
(“If the fact sought to be proved under the suggested non-hearsay purpose is not
relevant, or it is relevant but its danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value, the hearsay objection should be sustained.”);
People v. Jura, 817 N.E.2d 968, 974–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (rejecting the State’s
argument that the content of the statement does not matter, and looking to the
content and substance of the challenged statement to determine that is was
hearsay). 1

The State says in a footnote that Martinez’s “relevance-based arguments
are unpreserved.” SB at 20 n. 5. This argument is misplaced. Martinez does not
argue, and could not argue, that the challenged statements themselves are
irrelevant under rule 401. See OB at 16-21. Indeed, the statements are relevant—
just not for a valid non-truth purpose. See id. To the extent Martinez relies on
principles of relevance, he does so only to aid in the interpretation of the primary
issue on appeal: whether the challenged statements were offered for their truth.
See id. Martinez was not required to preserve all of his “arguments for or against
a particular ruling on an issue raised below.” State v. Fahina, 2017 UT App 111,
1

4

The State also relies on a series of Utah cases for the proposition that
“[t]his Court holds that out-of-court statements offered to explain actions are not
hearsay.” SB at 17. These cases are distinguishable because the various objective
factors discussed above demonstrated that the statements were offered for a
purpose other than their truth. See supra pp. 2-3.
In State v. Pedersen, out-of-court statements were offered to explain why a
victim advocate reported suspicions of sexual abuse, but the actual substance and
content of the statements was not admitted. 2010 UT App 38, ¶¶6, 23-24, 227
P.3d 1264. In this case, by contrast, the hearsay repeated the “definite,” detailed
allegations of the Tooele residents and identified Martinez as the culprit. Davis,
2007 UT App 13, ¶24; OB at 20.
In State v. Perez, it was clear from the context that the actual purpose of
the statement, “somebody told me the car was stolen,” was to explain subsequent
action. 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). There, the statement was offered by
the defense through the testimony of the defendant, who was charged with theft
by receiving a stolen car. Id. at 2-3. Under these circumstances, it was evident
that the defendant was not offering the statement for its truth because a truth
inference actually hurt the proponent/defendant. See id. Contrarily, here, the
context shows that the statements were offered for their truth because the State

¶21, 400 P.3d 1177. He only needed to preserve the hearsay “issue,” which he did.
Id.; R.709.
5

offered them during its case in chief, and a truth inference supported the
elements that the State was required prove. See R.709; see also OB 21-25.
Furthermore, in In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), and State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237, the non-truth purposes for which the
statements were offered were in “issue.” Stratford, 689 P.2d at 364. In G.Y., a
parental termination case, the DCFS services provided to the appellant/parent
were an important factor in the trial court’s termination decision. 962 P.2d at 83.
Thus, the challenged statements were non-hearsay where they “establish[ed] that
sufficient services were offered” and “explain[ed] actions [the DCFS caseworker]
took in performing her duties.” Id. at 86.
Meanwhile, Loose was a child sex abuse case where the trial court
identified as an issue the “significant amount of time between the dates of the
alleged offenses and the date the Defendant was charged.” 2000 UT 11, ¶25
(Howe, J., dissenting). Thus, the victim’s initial out-of-court disclosures to her
therapist were “essential for the jury to understand how these allegations against
the Defendant arose . . . .” Id. ¶¶3-4, 10. Here, by contrast, the alleged non-truth
purpose was not an issue. See OB at 19-20. Indeed, there was no issue or dispute
regarding why Rafael asked Martinez, “are you looking for me to kill me.” See id.
The State’s case law is thus distinguishable because in those cases, various
objective factors indicated that the statements were offered for a valid non-truth
purpose. But here, for the reasons stated in opening, the objective circumstances

6

demonstrate that the statements were offered for their truth. See id. at 15-21.
Thus, the Tooele residents’ statements constituted hearsay.
II.

Martinez’s discharge of a firearm convictions must be vacated.
In opening, Martinez asks this Court to vacate his discharge convictions

under subsection 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine; under
subsection 76-1-402(3)’s lesser-included offense doctrine; and under the doctrine
of common law merger. See OB at 28-44. At the outset, Martinez acknowledges
that during the pendency of this appeal, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v.
Wilder, 2018 UT 17. There, the supreme court “renounce[d] the common-law
merger test.” Id. ¶38. Thus, Martinez’s common-law merger argument is no
longer in play.
Meanwhile, the State does not challenge Martinez’s contention that his
convictions arose from the “same act” under subsection 76-1-402(1)’s single
criminal episode doctrine. See generally SB at 31-39. At this point, then, the
primary contested issues are: (1) whether—as the State argues—the legislature
expressly prohibits merger of felony discharge and attempted murder, see SB at
31-35; and (2) whether discharge and attempted murder share a lesser-greater
relationship for purposes of subsection 76-1-402(3). See id. at 35-39.
The opening brief adequately addresses the lesser-greater relationship
issue. See OB at 33-37. This reply addresses the State’s contention that the
“murder statute explicitly permits both separate convictions and punishments for
felony discharge of a firearm and attempted murder.” See id. at 35. The plain
7

language of the murder statute defeats this argument in several ways. As shown
below, the murder statute’s merger exemption does not apply to attempt crimes;
it does not apply to knowing/intentional murder; or alternatively, it only negates
the application of lesser-included offense merger.
The murder statute describes the various ways a defendant can commit
murder. One way to commit murder is to “intentionally or knowingly cause[] the
death of another.” Utah Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). This was the provision under
which the State alleged that Martinez attempted murder. R.1-6.
Another way to commit murder is to kill someone during the commission
of a “predicate offense,” a.k.a. felony murder. Utah Code § 76-5-203(2)(d).
Predicate offense is defined to include a long list of felonies, including discharge
of a firearm. Utah Code § 76-5-203(1)(v). Then, subsection § 76-5-203(5) states:
(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that
constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of
murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate
offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate
offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate
offense.
Utah Code § 76-5-203(5).
The State concedes that subsection (5)(b) of the merger exemption applies
only to felony murder and thus, “does not apply” here. SB at 33. It contends,
however, that subsection (5)(a) applies to all murders—including
knowing/intentional murder. Id. Thus, in the State’s view, subsection (5)(a)
allows for separate convictions and punishments for felony discharge of a firearm
8

and attempted murder. Id. Contrary to the State’s claim, subsection (5)(a) does
not exempt attempted murder and felony discharge from the merger
requirements of section 76-1-402.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the “[l]egislature exempts a statute
from the requirements of the merger doctrine only when ‘an explicit indication of
legislative intent is present.’” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶70, 361 P.3d 104
(quoting State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶11, 122 P.3d 615). In deciding whether a
statute is exempt, the plain statutory language controls. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶11.
Thus, the most obvious problem with the State’ argument is that section 76-5203(5)(a) plainly applies to the crime of murder—not attempted murder.
The State tries to explain away this problem by citing to the Utah Supreme
Court case, State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106. But Casey does not address
merger or the applicability of the merger exemption to attempted murder. See
generally id. Nor does it state that legislative references to “murder” necessarily
include “attempted murder.” Id. On the contrary, Casey recognizes that
attempted murder requires “different elements” than murder. Id. ¶15. Casey,
therefore, does not help the State.
The plain language of section 76-5-203(5)(a)’s merger exception is even
more fatal to the State’s argument. The provision omits any reference to
“attempted murder,” indicating that the exemption apply only to “murder”
charges. Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a). Moreover, the explicit reference to
“attempted murder” in the immediately preceding paragraph demonstrates that
9

the omission was purposeful. Utah Code § 76-5-203(4)(c) (“This affirmative
defense reduces charges only from . . . attempted murder to attempted
manslaughter.” (emphasis added)); see also Phillips v. Dep’t of Com., Div. of Sec.,
2017 UT App 84, ¶22, 397 P.3d 863 (“Because ‘[this court] presume[s] that the
expression of one term should be interpreted as the exclusion of another,’ [this
court] ‘seek[s] to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all
omissions to be purposeful.’”). Indeed, had the legislature intended to exempt
“attempted murder” as well, “it would have said so.” Johansen v. Johansen, 2002
UT App 75, ¶8, 45 P.3d 520. Thus, in the absence of an “explicit indication”
otherwise, section 76-1-402’s merger principles apply to attempted murder and
felony discharge. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶70.
In any event, the plain language and structure of the murder statute
suggest that the merger exemption does not apply to knowing/intentional
attempted murder—only felony murder. The murder statute’s merger exemption
applies to “murder” and “[a]ny predicate offense described in Subsection (1) . . . .”
Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a). Subsection (1) defines predicate offense. Utah Code
§ 76-5-203(1). Specifically, it states “[a]s used in this section, ‘predicate offense’
means . . .,” and then it goes on to enumerate a list of felonies—among them,
felony discharge. Id. Yet “[a]s used” in the murder section,” the notion of a
“predicate offense” is unique to the definition of felony murder; in felony murder,
it is the “predicate offense” that provides a basis for the murder charge. Utah
Code § 76-5-203(1), (2)(d). Indeed, “‘[p]redicate’ means ‘to base or establish (a
10

statement or action, for example).’” Phillips v. Com., 694 S.E.2d 805, 810 (Va. Ct.
App. 2010) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1382 (4th ed. 2006)). Moreover, a “predicate offense” is commonly
understood as “[a]n earlier offense that can be used to enhance a sentence levied
for a later conviction.” Black's Law Dictionary 1188 (9th ed. 2004). Consistent
with this definition, Utah courts have held that predicate felonies are enhancing
factors that are used to enhance an otherwise unintentional killing to murder.
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Utah 1990).
By using the word “predicate,” the statute indicates that the enumerated
felonies must form the “base” for something else, i.e. murder. See Utah Code §
76-5-203(1), (2), (5). While enumerated felonies provide a base for felony
murder, they do not form the base for the other variations of murder. See Utah
Code § 76-5-203(1), (2). Thus, for purposes of felony murder, the enumerated
felony offenses operate as predicates for murder, making them “predicate
offenses” that are subject to the merger exemption. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1),
(2), (5). But when a defendant is charged with another variation of murder, the
enumerated offenses are not predicates for murder. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1),
(2). Under these circumstances, they are not “predicate offenses” to which the
merger exemption attaches. See Utah Code § 76-5-203(1), (2), (5).
In this case, Martinez was charged with attempted knowing/intentional
murder. R.1-6. While felony discharge is included in subsection (1)’s list of
enumerated felonies, it does not form the base of knowing/intentional murder.
11

See id. Thus, in this prosecution for attempted knowing/intentional murder,
felony discharge is not a true “predicate offense,” and thus, the merger exemption
does not apply. See id.
Martinez recognizes that this Court must give meaning to both subsections
of the merger exemption so as to avoid superfluity. Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of
Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶11, 368 P.3d 846. The State attempts to do so by
interpreting subsection 5(a) to apply to all variations of murder and subsection
5(b) to apply to felony murder alone. See SB at 33. But holding that both
subsections apply to felony murder does not render any provision superfluous.
Subsections 5(a) and 5(b) of the merger exemption target the distinct
merger provisions of subsection 76-1-402. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1402(1), (3). As explained in opening, section 76-1-402 provides two independent
grounds for vacating Martinez’s discharge convictions: (1) they violate the single
criminal episode doctrine of subsection 76-1-402(1); and (2) they violate the
lesser-included offense doctrine of subsection 76-1-402(3). See OB at 28-37. Both
subsections of the merger exemption target felony murder, but subsection 5(a)
negates the application of the lesser-included offense doctrine, and subsection
5(b) negates the application of the single criminal episode doctrine. See Utah
Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-402(1), (3).
This is born out by the statutory language. Subsection 5(b) expressly allows
a defendant to be “punished for” both murder and a predicate offense. Utah Code
§ 76-5-203(5)(b). Section 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine is also
12

concerned with “punish[ment],” prohibiting multiple punishments for different
offenses that are based on “the same act of a defendant.” Utah Code § 76-1402(1).
Meanwhile, unlike subsection 5(b), subsection 5(a) does not expressly
allow for multiple punishments and omits reference to “punish[ment]”
altogether. Utah Code § 76-5-203(5); see also Biddle v. Washington Terrace City,
1999 UT 110, ¶14, 993 P.2d 875 (“[O]missions in statutory language should ‘be
taken note of and given effect.’”). Instead, subsection 5(a) states that a predicate
offense “does not merge with the crime of murder.” Utah Code § 76-5-203(5)(a)
(emphasis added). While the word “merger” is often used as a shorthand
(including in this brief), “merger” is a legal term of art which, in criminal law, is
defined as “[t]he absorption of a lesser included offense into a more serious
offense when a person is charged with both crimes.” Merger, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added); see also State v. Richter, 402 P.3d
1016, 1025 n.11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (“The merger doctrine only ‘applies to lesserincluded offenses.’”). By using a term associated with lesser-included offense
merger and omitting reference to “punish[ment],” it is evident that the legislature
intended for subsection 5(a) to negate the application of subsection 76-1-402(3)’s
lesser-included offense doctrine. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1-402(1), (3).
Thus, the statutory language suggests that subsections 5(a) and 5(b) work to
negate the distinct provisions of the merger statute in the context of a felony
murder prosecution. See id.
13

Finally, even if subsection 5(a) does—as the State argues—apply to
Martinez’s knowing/intentional attempted murder conviction, this Court should
still vacate Martinez’s discharge convictions. See Utah Code §§ 76-5-203(5); 76-1402(1), (3). As argued above, subsection 5(a) precludes the application of lesserincluded offense merger. See id. But unlike subsection 5(b), it does not allow for
multiple “punish[ments]” so as to preclude the application of the single criminal
episode doctrine. See id. Accordingly, Martinez’s discharge convictions should be
vacated because he was punished twice for the “same act” in violation of section
76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode doctrine. See OB at 28-33.
In short, the merger exemption of subsection 5(a) does not apply in this
case because Martinez was convicted of attempted murder. Still, it does not apply
because Martinez was convicted of attempted knowing/intentional murder, and
the exemption applies only to felony murder. Alternatively, the exemption does
not negate the application of section 76-1-402(1)’s single criminal episode
doctrine. Thus, this Court may apply the provisions of section 76-1-402 to vacate
Martinez’s discharge convictions. See id. at 28-37.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons here and in opening, Martinez respectfully asks this Court
to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. Alternatively, he asks this
Court to vacate his convictions for discharge of a firearm.
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